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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
THE LONGARM REACHES TOO
FAR-BURGER KING CORP. V.
R UDZE WICZ
Defined broadly, jurisdiction is the court's power to hear and
determine controversies.' Courts must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the controversy as well as jurisdiction over the
1. Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 III. 115, 195 N.E. 657, 659 (1935). Many definitions of
jurisdiction exist. See Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 380 (1936). However,
they all fundamentally mean the power or capacity given by the law to an official entity,
such as a court, to entertain and determine certain controversies. 55 P.2d at 380; see In re
Estate of DeCamillis, 66 Misc. 2d 882, 888, 322 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County),
affd mei., 38 App. Div. 2d 687, 327 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1st Dep't 1971). Literally, the meaning
of jurisdiction is "the saying or declaring (dictio) of the law (juris)." &. CASAD, JURISDICTION
IN CIVIL ACTIONS 1-1 (1983).
2. See R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 1-2. "A court is said to have jurisdiction of the subject
matter of an action if the case is one of the type of cases that the court has been empow-
ered to entertain by the sovereign from which the court derives its authority." Id. There is
a distinction to be drawn between courts of general jurisdiction and those of limited juris-
diction. See id. at 1-3; see also D. SIumm, NEw YORK PRACTICE § 8 at 10 (1978) (describing
limited jurisdiction of federal courts). Each state has a court of general jurisdiction which is
empowered to hear almost every type of case. R. CASAD, supra note I, at 1-3. The states
also have courts of a more specialized nature whose jurisdiction extends only over particu-
lar types of cases. Id. The extent of a court's jurisdiction is determined by statutory or
constitutional provisions which explicitly outline the parameters of that court's power. Id.
at 1-3.
Although states have courts of both general and limited jurisdiction, all federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. d. The primary limitations placed on the jurisdiction of
federal courts are found in the Constitution. See US. CONST. art. III, § 2. Federal courts,
which include the Supreme Court and "such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish," id. at § 1, cl. 1, have the power to hear cases authorized by
the Constitution and any statutory provisions enacted by Congress. K_ CASAD, supra note 1.
at 1-3. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction only in cases involving ambassadors
and those in which a state is a party. U.S. CONsT. art. 111, § 2, cl. 2. The Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction extends to any case included in its grant of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, subject to any exceptions and regulations made by Congress. Id. at cl. 2. Congress has
further restricted the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by requiring that additional
statutory criteria be met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (codifying diversity jurisdiction in
civil cases, but further providing that the amounit in controversy must exceed $10,000 ex-
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parties3 before a valid judgment may be entered.' If either ele-
clusive of interest and costs).
Due to the limited nature of federal jurisdiction, a federal court must dismiss an action
for want of subject matter jurisdiction regardless of how far the action has progressed. See
Owens Equip. and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978) (Supreme Court
dismissed action for lack of complete diversity even though verdict was returned for plain-
tiff at trial level): see also FF. R. Civ. P. 12(hX3). The court must act on the motion of
either party, including the party who alleged proper jurisdiction, or it can act on its own
motion. See id. This rule helps to assure that federal courts do not infringe on the powers
reserved to the states by the ninth and tenth amendments of the Constitution. C. WRIGHr,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS 22-24 (1983).
3. See Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966).
Personal jurisdiction is defined as "the Court's ability to assert judicial power over the
parties and bind them by its adjudication." Id. In order for a valid judgment to be entered,
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the defendant have
notice of the suit and an opportunity to be heard. D. SiEGEL,.supra note 2, § 58 at 59.
Moreover, the clause requires a jurisdictional basis, i.e., a connection between the forum
state and either the defendant or the case. See id.
Traditionally, jurisdictional basis existed if the defendant was "physically present" in the
state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878). This theory continues to provide for
jurisdictional basis where: (1) the defendant is domiciled in the state; (2) the defendant is
physically present; or, (3) the defendant consents to the court's jurisdiction. Id. See generally
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Con-
veniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (discussion and criticism of rule making physical presence
in forum state a sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
In Milliken v. Myers, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), the Court allowed the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over an absent defendant found to be domiciled within the state. Id. at 463.
Since the state provided the domiciliary with certain rights and benefits, it was considered
his duty to respond to a lawsuit in that state. Id.
The Court, in Philadelphia and Reading Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917), noted
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment when its corporate activities reached a
level that supported a finding of "'corporate presence." Id. at 265.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has upheld the exercise of in personam jurisdiction based
upon acts done within a state, reasoning that the actor had "impliedly consented" to the
court's jurisdiction by engaging in these specified acts. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927) (implied consent based on the use by an individual of a state's highways). These
subsequent bases of jurisdiction were recognized by the Supreme Court in an effort to
circumvent the restrictions imposed by Pensnoyer due to the impracticability of strict adher-
ence to the Pennoyer test. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In
PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts fom Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv.
569 (1958).
The fourteenth amendment Due Process Clause requires that the defendant have notice
of the suit and an opportunity to be heard. See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882);
D. SIEGE., supra note 2, § 58 at 59. There must be a reasonable probability that the de-
fendant will receive actual notice of the pending litigation before the service of process will
be deemed adequate. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950); Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623, 627 (1935). The procedure employed could be personal service on the defendant
in any form allowed by law, so long as there is a reasonable probability of notice to the
defendant. See R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 1-6 - 1-7.
Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, see supra note 2, lack of personal jurisdiction is a waiv-
able defect, i.e., the defendant may consent to jurisdiction, or an objection may be deemed
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ment is missing, the judgment entered in the proceeding is void
and will not be entitled to full faith and credit in other forums.'
waived if the defendant raises it too late. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(hXl); see Petrowski v. Hawkeye-
Security Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495, 496 (1956) (per curiam) (defendant waived jurisdictional
objection by stipulation).
4. R. CASAD, supra note I. at 1-2.
5. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958). The Constitution provides that: "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, andJudicial Pro-
ceedings of every other state." US. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, cl. I (emphasis added). The purpose
of the Framers of the Constitution was to make a collection of individual sovereign states
into a single nation by compelling each state to defer to a determination of the obligations
of parties created by laws of the other states. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
295 (1942) (quoting Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935)). The
Full Faith and Credit Clause acts to assure that the rights acquired or confirmed under the
public acts and judicial proceedings of one state are recognized as valid in other states. See
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). One of
the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to insure that once a judgment is ren-
dered in one state, it will be treated as conclusive of the parties' rights in every court of the
several states. See Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 N.J. 594, 604, 118 A.2d 21, 27
(1955). By giving valid judgments full faith and credit, the courts of other states avoid
relitigation of issues already adjudicated. Oldham v. McRoberts, 21 App. Div. 2d 231. 235,
249 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (4th Dep't 1964), afd mm., 15 N.Y.2d 891, 893, 206 N.E.2d 358,
358, 258 N.Y.S.2d 424, 424 (1965).
Although the merits of a case may not be relitigated after a previous adjudication, a
judgment is conclusive upon the merits only if the court had jurisdiction to render judg-
ment. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). The doctrine of Full Faith
and Credit "comes into operation only when . . . 'the jurisdiction of the court in another
state is not impeached, either as to the subject matter or to the person."' Id. at 228 (quoting
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873)) (emphasis added). If the question of
jurisdiction has been previously litigated, that determination is final. See, e.g., Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) (jurisdiction over subject matter final); Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931) (jurisdiction over person final).
Moreover, the determination of personal jurisdiction is final if the defendant consents to it,
see D. SiwGEL, supra note 2, § 98 at 114, or if the defendant appears without objecting to it.
Id. § I II at 139; see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
The Constitution also states that "Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." US.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. Congress has passed legislation effectuating this clause. See 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). The provision provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the
court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in euery court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they hae by law and usage in the courts of such State, Terri-
tory or Possession from which they are taken.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The standards promulgated by the Supreme Court for determin-
ing an appropriate exercise of in personam jurisdiction, although
accepted as proper guidelines, are vague, and tend to promote
By enacting this statute, Congress codified the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it applied
to the states and extended this concept to the federal courts, requiring that a final, valid
state judgment be accorded full faith and credit in the federal system. See Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 466 & n.6 (1982).
Although it is well established that federal courts are obliged to give judgments of a state
court the same preclusive effect as the courts of that state would, see Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90. 96 (1980), there have been exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit doctrine. See,
e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284. -, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1802 (1984)
(section 1738 not applicable to arbitration award); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980) (successive workman's compensation awards not barred by Full
Faith and Credit Clause); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (Full Faith
and Credit Clause not applicable when court did not have jurisdiction to enter underlying
judgment). For background and historical information on the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
see generally Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945) (discussion of judicial evolution of Full Faith and Credit Clause);
Nadelman, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 Mica. L. REV. 33 (1957)
(application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to "Public Acts"); Radin, The Authenticated Full
Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL L. REV. 1 (1944) (historical evaluation of Full
Faith and Credit Clause); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith And Credit to Judgments,
49 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1949) (survey of decisions interpreting Full Faith and Credit
Clause).
6. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (defendant must purposefully
avail itself of benefits and protection of laws of forum); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (contract had substantial connection with forum); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (defendant must have minimum
contacts with forum state such that maintenance of suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice).
International Shoe was the first case to discard the territorial theory of personal jurisdic-
tion articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878). International Shoe Co. ar-
gued that its corporate activities were insufficient to establish its corporate presence in
Washington as a basis of jurisdiction. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315. It contended that
its activities amounted to "mere solicitation" of business, which had previously been held
insufficient as a basis of jurisdiction. Id. at 315-16. The Supreme Court was thus presented
with an opportunity to expand the traditional territorial power concept of jurisdiction that
had been the rule since Pennoyer and which had become obsolete due to factors such as the
increasing mobility of the nation. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (statute author-
izing service of process on state official for action arising out of nonresident's use of vehicle
within state upheld). Given this opportunity, the Court stated that the physical presence of
a defendant was no longer required to enter a valid personal judgment against him. The
Court further noted:
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenence of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice".
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted).
The International Shoe standards were promulgated with the intention of avoiding
mechanical or quantitative rules when determining in personam jurisdiction. See id. at 319.
The Supreme Court opted for a factual determination in each case under a due process
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Longarm
uncertainty in establishing this important threshold requirement.'
One area of particular uncertainty in determining a proper exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction is where a single contract acts as
the basis of jurisdiction.8
analysis rather than applying any rigid rule of law. See. id.
The standards articulated in International Shoe have been closely scrutinized by commen-
tators. See Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process, 54
NoraR DAME LAw. 587, 595 (1979) (flexibility of International Shoe standards creates uncer-
tainty of application): Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49
U. CHI. L REv. 156, 160-64 (1982) (rejecting International Shoe's balancing approach for
fixed rules and principles).
Similarly, Justice Black refused to join the Court in "formulat[ing] broad rules as to the
meaning of due process[.]" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322 (Black, J., dissenting). One
of justice Black's main concerns was that "application of this natural law concept. . . makes
judges the supreme arbiters of the country's laws and practices." Id. at 326 (Black, J., dis-
senting). In other words, Justice Black feared that the ad hoe rules set forth in the case
would leave important determinations too much to the discretion of the court deciding the
question of jurisdiction, thereby promoting uncertainty in the law, as well as infringing on
the powers reserved to the states by the United States' constitutional form of government.
See id. (Black, J., dissenting).
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Supreme Court, apply-
ing the International Shoe test, stressed fairness between the respective parties, thereby
deemphasizing the fact that the contact in issue was minimal. Id. at 223. For purposes of a
due process analysis, the Court held that it was "sufficient ... that the suit was based on a
contract which had substantial connection with that state." Id.; see infra note 44 and accom-
panying text.
The next year, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that jurisdiction was no longer restricted by Pennoyer, but reaffirmed certain jurisdic-
tional limitations that might have been undermined by the language of McGee. Id. at 251.
The Court stated that "the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer... to the flexible standard of International Shoe...
but it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts." Id. The Hanson Court required something
more than a showing of convenience to the parties. Id. at 253. The Court proclaimed that
the exercise of jurisdiction by a forum state is not justified unless "there [is] some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." Id.
7. Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: A Limit to the Expansion of Long-
Arm Jurisdiction, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 630 (1981). "One cannot deny that the balancing
approach grants the court a great deal of discretion. In addition, it creates a sizeable
amount of uncertainty due to the inconsistencies that are liable to result from a court's
balancing of various considerations." Id. See also Comment, supra note 6, at 160 (balancing
approach should be rejected due to inherent unpredictability). But see Nordenberg, supra
note 6, at 594-95 (balancing approach preferable despite unpredictability).
8. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (insurance con-
tract as basis of jurisdiction); Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prod., Inc., 619 F.2d
676 (7th Cir. 1980) (contract for computer system as basis of jurisdiction); see also Baxter v.
Mouzavires, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) (agreement be-
tween law firm and patent attorney); Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc. v. Chelsea House
Publishers, 621 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982) (purchase or-
der sent from defendant to plaintiff); Lakeside Bridge and Steel Co. v. Mountain State
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Recently, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,9 the Supreme Court
of the United States evaluated a state court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion based upon a franchise agreement." The Court held that the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a franchisee, pursuant to
the Florida longarm statute,1 would not violate the Due Process
Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (contract to furnish
structural assemblies to defendant).
The denial of certiorari in the latter three cases prompted dissenting opinions voicing
concern over the disharmony among federal and state courts on the issue of single con-
tracts as a jurisdictional basis. See Baxter v. Mouzavires, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) (White and
Powell, JJ., dissenting); Chelsea House Publishers v. Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc., 455
U.S. 994 (1982) (White, J., Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting); Lakeside Bridge and
Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (White and Powell, JJ., dis-
senting). See generally Brewer, Jurisdiction in Single Contract Cases, 6 U. ARK. LrTrLE Rocx
L.J. 1 (1983) (illustrating confusion in single contract cases); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdic-
tion in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. Rav. 375 (1981) (single
contract cases in light of Supreme Court decisions); Comment, Transacting Business as juris-
dictional Basis - A Survey of New York Case Law, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 525 (1965) (contract
cases in New York).
9. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. _, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
10. Id. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2177-78. In Burger King, the franchisor instituted an ac-
tion and contended that jurisdiction could be asserted over the franchisees, Rudzewicz and
MacShara, based on an alleged breach of their franchise agreement. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct.
at 2180. Since the agreement required payments to be submitted in Florida, Burger King
contended that the defendants could be reached under the applicable provision of the Flor-
ida longarm statute. See id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2180. The defendants contested this
exercise of jurisdiction and asserted that the claim did not arise in Florida. Id. at - 105
S. Ct. at 2180. The District Court held that the failure to remit payments in Miami "fell
within the reach of the Florida long-arm statute and that the exercise of jurisdiction was
constitutional." Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2181 n.12.
Once found subject to the personal jurisdiction of the District Court, the defendants
filed an answer and a counterclaim. Id. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2180. After a three day bench
trial, judgment was entered against the defendants.
Rudzewicz appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on the merits of the judgment, the disposi-
tion of the counterclaim, and the issue of personal jurisdiction. Burger King v. MacShara,
724 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984). MacShara did not file an appeal. Id. at 1505 n.1.
The appellate court did not reach the merits of the lower court ruling, deciding that the
district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz. Id. at 1508. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit found the exercise of jurisdiction in this instance offensive to
due process. Id. at 1513. Burger King then appealed this determination. See Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. - 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
11. FtL. STAT. ANN. § 4 8 .19 3 (1)(g) (West Supp'. 1985). The Florida longarm statute
provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or
through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits
himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the
following acts:
(g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the
Longarm
Clause of the fourteenth amendment."'
In Burger King, a large Miami-based franchisor brought an ac-
tion in the Federal District Court of Florida against two Michigan
franchisees for breach of their franchise agreement and for tor-
tious infringement of trademarks.1 ' The franchisees entered a
special appearance to contest the court's exercise of personal juris-
diction over them as Michigan resident. 1 4 After this motion was
denied, and a trial was had, the District Court entered judgments
against both franchisees."
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District
Court," finding that jurisdiction had been exercised in violation
of due process.17
contract to be performed in this state.
Id.
12. Burger King, 471 U.S. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2190.
13. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2180. Rudzewicz and MacShara entered into a franchise
agreement with Burger King wherein Burger King licensed the use of its trademarks and
service marks for 20 years and leased a standardized restaurant for the same period of
time. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2178. Moreover, pursuant to the agreement: the franchisees
were educated by Burger King in restaurant management; the operation of the business
was strictly regulated by Burger King to insure uniformity; and, the franchisees paid a
$40,000 franchise fee and obligated themselves to substantial indebtedness arising from
many different fees. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2178.
Franchise supervision was conducted through a two-tiered system which consisted of a
series of district offices which reported to the main office in Miami. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct.
at 2178-79. After protracted negotiations, Rudzewicz and MacShara began the operation
of their franchise in 1979. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2179. Due to poor business, the fran-
chisees found themselves behind in their monthly obligations. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at
2179. After extensive negotiations between the Miami office and the franchisees proved
fruitless, the Miami headquarters terminated the franchise agreement and ordered the
franchisees to vacate the premises. Id. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2179-80. After the franchisees
disregarded the notice of termination and continued to operate the restaurant as a Burger
King facility, the franchisor brought suit for tortious infringement of trademarks and ser-
vice marks. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2179-80.
14. Burger King, 471 U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2180. The defendants contended that
the cause of action did not arise in the state of Florida and, therefore, the Florida longarm
statute did not reach them, as they were Michigan residents. Id. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2180.
15. Burger King, 471 U.S. at .-.. 105 S. Ct. at 2180. The district court entered judg-
ment against both franchisees for $288,875 in contract damages. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at
2180. The court ordered both franchisees to cease operating the restaurant as a Burger
King facility. Id. at , 105 S. Ct. 2180. The court also awarded costs and attorney's fees
to Burger King. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2180.
16. Burger King v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
17. Id. The Court of Appeals noted:
In sum, we hold that the circumstances of the Drayton Plains franchise and the ne-
gotiations which led to it left Rudzewicz bereft of reasonable notice and financially
unprepared for the prospect of franchise litigation in Florida. Jurisdiction under
these circumstances would offend the fundamental fairness which is the touchstone
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Burger King appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States.'6 The Supreme Court held that there was no due process
violation," stating that "there is substantial record evidence sup-
porting the District Court's conclusion that the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz in Florida for the alleged breach
of his franchise agreement did not offend due process."10 In so
holding, the Court noted that the franchisee had established a
substantial and continuing relationship with the franchisor's head-
quarters in the forum state"' and that the contract documents and
the course of dealing between the parties afforded the franchisee
with fair notice of possible litigation in the forum state.' 2 The
Court further noted that the franchisee had failed to demonstrate




18. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2181. The Supreme
Court decided that even though an appeal did not properly lie in this instance, see id. at
- 105 S. Ct. at 2181 & n.12, the importance of the question presented required the
granting of certiorari. Id. at.-, 105 S. Ct. at 2181.
19. Burger King, 471 U.S. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
20. Id. at , 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
21. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2186. The Court stated:
[Tlhis franchise dispute grew directly out of "a contract which had a substantial con-
nection with that state." ... Eschewing the option of operating an independent local
enterprise, Rudzewicz deliberately "reach[ed] out beyond" Michigan and negotiated
with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long term franchise and the mani-
fest benefits that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide organization....
Upon approval, he entered into a carefully structured 20-year relationship that envi-
sioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida ...
Rudzewicz' refusal to make the contractually required payments in Miami, and his
continued use of Burger King's trademarks and confidential business information
after his termination, caused foreseeable injury to the corporation in Florida. For
these reasons it was, at the very least, presumptively reasonable for Rudzewicz to be
called to account there for such injuries.
Id. at -. 105 S. Ct. at 2186 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2186-87. The Burger King Court observed that the con-
tract documents emphasized that Burger King's operations were conducted from the
Miami headquarters. Id. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2186. Moreover, all notices and payments
were to be sent to Miami, and all agreements were deemed made and enforced there. Id. at
-. 105 S. Ct. at 2186. As to the course of dealings between the parties, the Court noted
"that decisionmaking authority was vested in the Miami headquarters." d. at _ 105 S.
Ct. at 2186-87. The Court highlighted the provisions in the franchise documents which
stipulated that all disputes would be governed by Florida law. See id. at .. _, 105 S. Ct. at
2187.
23. Burger King, 471 U.S. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2187-88. The Burger King Court found
no legitimate reason for denying Florida's assertion of jurisdiction. Although the Court
Longarm
The Supreme Court was still unwilling to find that an individ-
ual's contract with an out of state resident was a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction when standing alone, 4 but the circumstances
surrounding the formulation and execution of the contractual
agreement had to be analyzed in light of the "minimum contacts"
test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington."
A two-justice dissent"6 maintained that the circumstances of the
case warranted a finding of unfairness sufficient to offend due pro-
cess.27 In formulating his dissent, Justice Stevens followed the ra-
tionale of the Court of Appeals and contended that Rudzewicz
had no reasonable notice of the possibility of litigation in Florida 8
and therefore was financially unprepared for the cost of distant
litigation."'
While Burger King purportedly follows the reasoning of contem-
acknowledged the inconvenience in defending distant litigation, it held that this inconve-
nience was not a constitutional barrier to exercising jurisdiction. See id. at -, 105 S. Ct.
at 2187-88.
24. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2187-88. The Burger King Court asserted its intention to
avoid mechanical rules. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2185, 2189 n.28; see International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
25. Burger King, 471 U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2186. "It is these factors - prior negoti-
ations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the
parties' actual course of dealing - that must be evaluated in determining whether the de-
fendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum." Id. at -, 105 S.
Ct. at 2186.
26. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J., joined by White, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens' dissent,
he stated: "In my opinion there is a significant element of unfairness in requiring a fran-
chisee to defend a case of this kind in the forum chosen by the franchisor." Id. at -, 105
S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2191 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals as-
serted that an exercise of jurisdiction would be fundamentally unfair. Burger King v. Mac-
Shara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984). In addition, the court was "'troubled by
elements of surprise which, if sanctioned, could ultimately sow the seeds of default judg-
ments for franchisees owing smaller debts." Id.
29. Burger King v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (1 1th Cir. 1984). It is interesting to
note that Justice Stevens, in his dissent, adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeals,
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. - , 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
while the Supreme Court majority acknowledged with approval the reasoning of the dis-
senting justice of the Court of Appeals. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2189. However, the facts
underlying the transaction were perceived by the Court of Appeals and the majority of the
Supreme Court differently. Compare Burger King v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1506-08
(11 th Cir. 1984) (overreaching franchisor taking advantage of unsuspecting franchisees)
with Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. -. 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2179-80 (1985) (arms
length dealing between parties of equal business savvy). This illustrates the unpredictability
of the Intarnational Shoe test. See Comment, supra note 6, at 160.
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porary jurisdictional decisions,30 it is submitted that the Court
misapplied the basic principles set forth in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington and could conceivably affect each state with a longarm
statute. The purpose of this Article is to show how the Burger
King Court misapplied the principles of International Shoe and the
possible effect the decision could have on two jurisdictions, New
York and California.3 1
I. MIS-APPLICATION OF International Shoe
One of the basic aims of the vague jurisdictional test" promul-
gated by International Shoe was to avoid the application of mechan-
ical rules in the exercise of personal jurisdiction. It is suggested
that the Supreme Court in Burger King upheld personal jurisdic-
tion in a case that may give rise to nationwide jurisdiction for
franchisors through the application of a mechanical test, even
though the Court purports to reject such a formulation."
The franchise agreement, which established the jurisdictional
basis in Burger King, was a standard form contract.3 6 The agree-
30. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2182. See, e.g., World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (no basis of jurisdiction where
defendant's only connection with forum state was plaintiff's decision to drive through it);
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (defendant not subject to jurisdic-
tion in California when only connection was result of permitting daughter to live with his
ex-wife there).
31. The New York longarm statute is illustrative of those statutes which limit the juris-
diction of their state courts by allowing an exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident defen-
dants only when the act which allegedly forms the basis of jurisdiction is specifically listed
in the statute. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1984-85). California,
in contrast to New York. will allow its state courts to exercise jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant in any manner not violative of due process considerations. See CAL. CrV.
PRoC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
This article is concerned only with an exercise of jurisdiction based upon a single con-
tract. Since the Burger King Court did not reach the question of whether tortious infringe-
ment of trademarks would be an act sufficient to constitute a valid jurisdictional basis, it is
unnecessary to discuss that issue in this article. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at
-, 105 S. Ct. at 2180 n.11.
32. See supra note 6.
33. International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
34. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. - , 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185, 2189 (1985). The
Burger King Court explicitly rejected the formulation of a mechanical rule and clearly man-
ifested an intention to evaluate each jurisdictional case on its individual facts. Id. at -,
105 S. Ct. at 2189.
35. See id. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2178-79; see also H. BROWN, FRAN HtSNc R.ALrrEs AND
REMEDIES § 1.03[4] (1981) (franchisor seldom, if ever, modifies potentially onerous terms of
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ment required a large downpayment by the franchisee and envi-
sioned substantial contractual indebtedness on his part. 6 The du-
ration of the agreement is identical in all Burger King
agreements.37 Due to the inherent disparity of bargaining power
between franchisors and franchisees, the terms of the agreement
are to a large extent non-negotiable." Therefore, since all Burger
King agreements are substantially identical,39 every franchisee
who defaults in his payment obligations should be subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the Florida courts when sued by Burger
King.40 Since it is not inconceivable that any franchise agreement
that couples a long-term obligation with substantial indebtedness
will be viewed as an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction, it is
submitted that this holding creates a mechanical rule in a large
number of single contract cases.' 1
agreement).
36. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2178-79. The Burger
King franchisees' initial investment was $40,000, id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2178, and
Rudzewicz' total expected indebtedness exceeded $1 million, id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at
2179. See generally H. BROWN, supra note 35, at § 1.04[1] (1981) (fees and obligations of
potential franchisees).
37. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2178. Both the licensing
agreement and the lease in Burger King continued over a 20 year period. Id. at -, 105 S.
Ct. at 2178.
38. H. BROWN, supra note 35, at § 1.01[3] 1-6. Harold Brown has asserted as follows:
There is still a gross disparity between the parties [to a franchise agreement], both at
the inception and during the relationship, not merely in skilled bargaining power,
financial strength, and the availability of experienced professional advisors, but also
functionally in the access to relevant information, and in economic exposure to loss.
Sophisticated marketers and attorneys have created agreements and systems of oper-
ation which strap the franchisee to contracts and practices of adhesion. These agree-
ments and systems are presented to the prospective franchisee on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, with callous disregard for fair play and even fundamental rights.
Id. (footnote omitted).
39. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
40. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2178. Since Burger
King is one of the largest franchisors in the world, with over 3,000 outlets, conducting
80% of its business through franchise operations, almost 2,400 franchisees could be haled
into a Miami court to answer suits based on their franchise agreement. See id. at -, 105
S. Ct. at 2178.
41. Cf. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (majority relied on standard boilerplate language as basis of jurisdiction). But see
Burger King, 471 U.S. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2189 n.28 (potential of creating mechanical
rules noted, but citing distinguishing factors). Although footnote 28 in the Burger King
opinion may preclude an extension of Burger King by analogy to other types of franchise
agreements, it does nothing to alleviate the general applicability of this case to Burger King
franchise agreements. See id. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2189 n.28.
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Another basic guideline mandated by the International Shoe
Court for determining the propriety of an exercise of personal
jurisdiction was that "the maintenance of the suit should not of-
fend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 2 In
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,43 the Supreme Court ex-
panded the International Shoe test perhaps to its constitutional
limit by upholding a California court's exercise of jurisdiction
over a Texas insurance company based on a single insurance con-
tract."' This decision placed a greater emphasis on considerations
of "fair play and substantial justice" than it did on the require-
ment of "certain minimum contacts."' The Court held that the
exercise of jurisdiction was proper because the contract had "a
substantial connection with the state."' 6
A year later, in Hanson v. Denckla,'7 the Supreme Court held
that a Delaware trustee was not subject to the personal jurisdic-
42. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
43. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
44. Id. at 223. The McGee Court found it sufficient for due process purposes that the
contract which was the basis of jurisdiction had a "substantial connection" with the forum
state. Id.
In McGee, a California resident purchased life insurance from an Arizona corporation. Id.
at 221. International Life Insurance, a Texas corporation, agreed to assume the insurance
obligations of the Arizona company and sent an offer of reinsurance to the policyholder.
Id. The California resident accepted the offer of reinsurance and paid premiums to the
corporation in Texas for two years. Id. at 222. This insurance contract was the only insur-
ance policy issued by the Texas corporation in California. Id. The Texas insurance com-
pany disclaimed liability under the policy after the policyholder's death and the beneficiary
sued in a California court. Id. Jurisdiction was grounded on a California statute subjecting
foreign corporations to suit in California due to their insurance contracts with California
residents. Id. at 221 & n. I.
The Supreme Court upheld this exercise ofjurisdiction since: the contract had a substan-
tial connection with the state; the state had a manifest interest in providing a forum for its
citizens when insurers failed to pay their claims, as evidenced by the enactment of a statute
conferring jurisdiction; and because there is a severe disadvantage attendant in making
residents pursue distant litigation. Id. at 223.
45. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223; see also Nordenberg, supra note 6, at 615. Professor
Nordenberg stated as follows:
Note that the important tie is the tie between the contract and the state, not the tie
between the defendant and the state. The two are not necessarily the same. In fact,
in assuming the strength of the connection between the contract and the foreign
state, the Court in McGee emphasized the plaintiff's interest in litigating the contract
questions at home, the state's interest in providing the resident plaintiff with a fo-
rum, and general considerations of trial convenience.
Nordenberg, supra note 6, at 615.
46. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
47. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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tion of a Florida state court based on the unilateral decision of the
settlor of the trust to exercise her power of appointment in
Florida.4'
Under Hanson, the Court's focus was directed to purposeful ac-
tivity between the defendant and the state seeking to exercise ju-
risdiction. 4' The more recent decisions"0 have concentrated on
the "purposeful availment" test of Hanson, determining whether
the defendant carried on activities that gave him reasonable no-
tice that he could be haled into the court of a foreign state,5 1 but
also have recognized the importance of considerations of "fair-
ness" inherent in a due process analysis."s
It is submitted that the Burger King Court places far too much
emphasis on defendant's activities while totally ignoring the as-
pects of fairness necessary to a proper due process analysis.' 3 The
48. Id. at 253. At issue in Hanson was the validity of a trust established in Delaware by a
Pennsylvania resident who ultimately became a domiciliary of Florida. Id. at 238-39, 253.
If valid, the $400,000 trust would pass to the settlor's grandchildren pursuant to an inter
vivos appointment. Id. at 239. If invalid, it would pass to the settlor's daughters pursuant to
the residuary clause of her will. Id. at 240.
After the settlor's death, the settlor's daughters, Florida residents, brought an action to
determine whether the $400,000 should pass to them under the residuary clause of the
settlor's will. Id. At the same time, the executrix of the estate brought a declaratory action
in Delaware to determine who was entitled to the assets. Id. at 242. The Florida court
declared the appointment invalid and held that the funds passed under the will. Id. at 243.
The Delaware court determined that the appointment and trust were valid and held that
the assets passed under the appointment. Id. at 242. Prior to this determination, the Flor-
ida decree had been entered and the Florida residents moved to have the Delaware court
afford the decree full faith and credit. Id.
The motion for full faith and credit was denied by the Delaware Supreme Court because
Florida law required the joinder of the trustee as an indispensable party in determining the
validity of the trust. Id. at 254. Since the Florida court never properly acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the trustee, id., the Delaware court held that the Florida judgment was
invalid, id. at 255, and therefore not entitled to full faith and credit in the Delaware courts.
Id.
49. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. The Hanson Court reasoned that: "[Ilt is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws." Id. (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Cali-
fornia Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
51. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court realized that foreseeability was important, and required
"that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (citations omitted).
52. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
53. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 222-25 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Brennan analyzed the contacts present in Shaffer and concluded that
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Court rejected out of hand any comparison of the net wealth of
the parties in ascertaining the fairness of jurisdiction." The Court
also subjugated the fairness requirement by requiring the defend-
ant to overcome a finding of "purposeful availment" of the forum
state's laws with a "compelling case" of unfairness. 6 It is. submit-
ted that a finding of "purposeful availment" under the Burger
King decision creates a presumption of jurisdiction rebuttable only
by a compelling case of unfairness." If McGee went too far in al-
lowing jurisdiction based on considerations of fairness, 7 then it is
submitted that Burger King goes too far in emphasizing defend-
ant's purposeful activity as an exclusive basis for personal
jurisdiction.
II. STATE COURT JURISDIcTION AFTER Burger King
In Burger King, the Supreme Court held that a construction of
the Florida longarm statute" categorizing payments required to
be made in Florida as "acts required to be performed in this
they were sufficient to warrant a constitutional finding of jurisdiction. Id. This determina-
tion was primarily based on the forum state's manifest interest in asserting jurisdiction over
a corporation formed under the laws of the state. d. at 223. See Nordenberg, supra note 6,
at 619 (Justice Brennan's discussion of defendant's contact with forum state "tacked on" at
end of opinion and had "minimal" place in his analysis).
54. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. - , 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2188 n.25 (1985). The
Burger King Court stated that jurisdiction may not be avoided merely on the basis of the
adversary's greater wealth, unless other "compelling considerations" are present. d. at
-, 105 S. Ct. at 2188 n.25.
55. d. at - , 105 S. Ct. at 2185. Once a defendant has been found to have purpose-
fully directed activities at a forum state, the Burger King Court asserted that he must pre-
sent a "compelling case" that jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
56. d. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2186. In Burger King, the Court found an assertion of
jurisdiction to be "presumptively reasonable," id., and later required a showing of "com-
pelling" considerations to defeat an assertion of jurisdiction. d. at -' - 105 S. Ct. at
2185, 2188 n.25.
57. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). The Hanson Court, commenting
on McGee, noted:
JIlt is a mistake to assume that this trend [toward expanding jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. . . . Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territo-
rial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its
exercise of power over him.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West Supp. 1985).
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state" 5" was consistent with the federal constitutional requirement
of due process.6 0
Although an exercise of jurisdiction may be permissible under
the Federal Constitution, a state is not compelled to confer that
jurisdictional power upon its court system." Therefore, each state
is free to phrase and interpret statutes and rules of jurisdiction to
a level that falls short of that allowed *by the Federal Constitu-
tion." The Supreme Court has no right or power to compel a
state to alter the construction of its jurisdictional statute because it
does not extend to the bounds of the Federal Constitution.6 The
remainder of this article will attempt to determine the effect of
the Burger King decision on the jurisdictional approach of New
York and California.
A. New York
New York's longarm statute is found in section 302 of its Civil
Practice Law and Rules." This section has a provision, amended
in 1979,68 conferring jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
based upon contracts." It is under this provision that jurisdiction
based upon a franchise agreement could be invoked."
The amendment to section 302 was added as a remedial mea-
sure to confer jurisdiction on defendants who were never physi-
59. Id. at § 48.193(1)(g).
60. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. -. 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2190 (1985).
61. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1952); Missouri Pac. R.
R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922); Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361
F.2d 706, 714 (4th Cir. 1966).
62. Lurie v. Rupe, 51 111. App. 2d 164, 201 N.E.2d 158, 161 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 964 (1965).
63. See Mechanical Contractors Assoc. of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors As-
soc. of Northern California, Inc., 342 F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1965).
64. N.Y. Civ. PAa LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1984-85).
65. Id.
66. Id. Section 302(aX) of New York's Civil Practice Law provides, in part:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person
or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods
or services in the state ...
Id. at § 302(aXI).
67. See id.
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cally present in New York." Prior to this amendment, the law was
settled that a mere shipment of goods into New York was insuffi-
cient to allow a New York tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant,69 but a "solicitation plus" doctrine al-
lowed jurisdiction when the defendant not only shipped goods
into the state, but also solicited business in New York.70
This amendment had the effect of creating a more expansive
jurisdiction for New York courts,7 granting jurisdiction based
upon contracts to supply goods or services in the state regardless
of the situs of contract formation." When deciding whether an
act forms an adequate basis for jurisdiction, the appellate courts
have interpreted the jurisdictional statute broadly."
The New York case most analogous to Burger King is Reiner v.
Schwartz.7" In Reiner, the defendant traveled to New York to exe-
cute an agreement which made the defendant the sole salesman in
plaintiff's New England market.1 5 Alleging that there was a con-
tractual breach, the plaintiff sought to exercise jurisdiction over
the Massachusetts resident." The New York court upheld this ex-
ercise of jurisdiction and stated that the facts and circumstances
were sufficient to find "the purposeful creation of a continuing
relationship with a New York corporation. 7
68. Lupton Assoc. v. Northeast Plastics, Inc., 105 App. Div. 2d 3, 6, 482 N.Y.S.2d 647,
650 (4th Dep't 1985); see also 'Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the
Legislature Relating to Revision of Certain Long Arm Jurisdiction Provisions in Article 3
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, [1979] N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP., reprinted in 11979]
N.Y. Laws 1451 (McKinney) (purpose behind proposed amendment which was eventually
passed into law).
69. McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 271, 419 N.E.2d 321, 322, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643,
644 (1981); Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 32, 215 N.E.2d 159, 161-62, 267 N.Y.S.2d
900, 903-04 (1966).
70. See Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 465-67, 209 N.E.2d 68, 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8,
25-26 (1965) (aggregate of solicitation of business and other factors enough to satisfy re-
quirements of jurisdiction).
71. See Lupton Assoc. v. Northeast Plastics, Inc., 105 App. Div. 2d 3, 6, 482 N.Y.S.2d
647, 650 (4th Dep't 1985).
72. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(aXI) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
73. See Lupton, 105 App. Div. 2d at 6, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 650. Jurisdiction under the New
York longarm statute is proper "whether or not the defendant is physically present, as long
as the business activity is sufficiently purposeful." Id., 482 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
74. 41 N.Y.2d 648, 363 N.E.2d 551, 394 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1977).
75. Id. at 649, 363 N.E.2d at 552, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
76. Id., 363 N.E.2d at 552, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
77. Id. at 653, 363 N.E.2d at 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848. One difference between Reiner
and Burger King is that the defendant in Reiner was physically present within the state. Id.
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In Reiner, the Court of Appeals quoted with approval the Su-
preme Court's holding in Hanson that the nature of the defend-
ant's activity must be a purposeful availment of the privileges in-
herent in conducting activities in the forum state.7s  This
"purposeful activity" requirement was reemphasized in McGowan
v. Smith.79 The Reiner Court also recognized the necessity of tem-
pering the exercise of jurisdiction so as to comport with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"" but this re-
quirement seems to be secondary to a finding of purposeful
activity by the defendant.'
Attempting to cull generalized rules from the case law, it is sub-
mitted that a New York court would look for purposeful activity
on the defendant's part" and then examine notions of fairness."
It is submitted that New York courts, when faced with the facts of
Burger King, would find jurisdiction proper in that the defendant
had established a continuing relationship with a New York resi-
dent" and that this cause of action arose out of this transaction of
at 649, 363 N.E.2d at 552, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 845. The Supreme Court in Burger King did
not decide if the defendant could be deemed present in the forum state, see Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 n.22, since this determination was not
necessary to the holding. Id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22. The Reiner court notes that
cases involving physical presence of the defendant are the "clearest sort of case[s]" of sec-
tion 302 jurisdiction. Reiner, 41 N.Y.2d at 652, 363 N.E.2d at 553, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
Surely a less clear, yet permissible, case could be made out without physical presence of the
defendant. See Lupton Assoc. v. Northeast Plastics, Inc., 105 App. Div. 2d 3, 6, 482
N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (4th Dep't 1985); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amjac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55,
60 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 17-19,
256 N.E.2d 506, 508-09, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340-41.
78. Reiner, 41 N.Y.2d at 651, 363 N.E.2d at 553, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
79. 52 N.Y.2d 268, 271, 419 N.E.2d 321, 322, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (1981).
80. Reiner, 41 N.Y.2d at 650, 363 N.E.2d at 552, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
81. See Hi Fashion Wigs v. Hammond Advertising, 32 N.Y.2d 583, 300 N.E.2d 421,
347 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1973) (Oklahoma defendant amenable to suit based on one trip to New
York to personally guarantee contract); Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13,
256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970) (California defendant amenable to suit based on
telephone participation in auction).
82. See, e.g., McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 271, 419 N.E.2d 321, 322, 437
N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (1981); Amodeo v. Star Mfg. Co., 88 App. Div. 2d 1081, 1082, 452
N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 (3rd Dep't 1982); Cato Show Printing Co. v. Howell, 84 App. Div. 2d
947, 949, 446 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (4th Dep't 1981).
83. See Reiner v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 649, 653, 363 N.E.2d 551, 551-52, 394
N.Y.S.2d 844, 845, 847 (1977); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amjac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 59
(2d Cir. 1985).
84. See Reiner v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 653, 363 N.E.2d 551, 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d
844, 847.
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business."
Furthermore, it is submitted that the requirement of payments
under the Burger King agreement could be construed as "con-
tracting to supply.., services within the state" in accordance with
section 302(a)(1)." Although this precise question has not yet
been decided by New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals
has decided that an incidental provision of services is insufficient
to confer jurisdiction under this section." As these payments
clearly are not incidental to the franchise agreement, it is submit-
ted that a contractually required remission of payments in New
York could fall within the language of the amended statute.
B. California
The California longarm statute is broad and wide-ranging."
The wording of the statute requires that exercises of jurisdiction
be consistent with both the state and federal constitutions.89 The
California courts have determined that the boundaries of the Cali-
fornia statute are defined by the "minimum contacts" test of Inter-
national Shoe."
California courts will exercise jurisdiction in any situation which
85. Cf. Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amjac. Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1985)
(although defendant was physically present, court placed greater emphasis on franchise
agreement and close connection between breach and contract). But cf. New York State Law
Digest No. 308 (Aug. 1985) jurisdiction in New York is "unclear"). Based on the expan-
sive reading of the statute and the language of the Lupton case, see Lupton Assoc. v. North-
east Plastics, Inc., 105 App. Div. 2d 3, 6,482 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (4th Dep't 1985),jurisdic-
tion may be properly based upon a contractually required remission of payments in New
York. See also Parke-Bernet Galleries. Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 17, 256 N.E.2d 506,
508, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1970) (physical presence not always required for jurisdiction,
but found physical presence of defendant's "agent"); Cato Show Printing Co. v. Howell, 84
App. Div. 2d 947, 949, 446 N.Y.S.2d 710, 712 (4th Dep't 1981) (physical presence not a
prerequisite to jurisdiction).
86. Supra note 66.
87. Cf. Etra v. Matta, 61 N.Y.2d 455, 459, 463 N.E.2d 3, 5. 474 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689
(1984) (incidental provision of drugs in course of treatment insufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on New York court).
88. CA. Civ. Paoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). Section 410.10 of the California Civil
Procedure Code provides: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." Id.; see also RI.
GE. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1956) (personal jurisdiction restricted by bounds of federal
Constitution).
89. See supra note 88.
90. Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1103 & n.2 (9th Cir.), cert dmied, 419 U.S.
1023 (1974).
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may be deemed "reasonable.' 1 When a party seeks to base juris-
diction upon a single act, the cause of action must be closely re-
lated to the defendant's activities within the forum state before
the exercise of jurisdiction will be proper." In determining
whether jurisdiction is reasonable, the California courts look for
some purposeful activity on the part of the defendant." In addi-
tion, there must be a determination that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion would be fair under the circumstances." The factors that
enter into the determination of what is fair and reasonable center
around convenience to the parties." When both prongs of this
test are met, the exercise of jurisdiction is proper under California
law."
Applying these rules to the facts of the Burger King case, it is
submitted that the California courts would exercise jurisdiction
over a Michigan individual on the basis of a franchise agreement
requiring the remission of payments in California. The franchis-
ees made contact with Burger King through their application for
a franchise and negotiated in the forum state when creating the
agreement. The franchisees contractually obligated themselves
to extensive indebtedness to the franchisor ss and benefited eco-
nomically from the franchise agreement." An economic benefit
"as a matter of commercial actuality" satisfies the minimum con-
91. Cornelison v. Chancy, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 147, 545 P.2d 264, 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352,
354 (1976).
92. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113, 118 (1969). Jurisdiction may properly be exercised over a non-resident defend-
ant for a cause of action unrelated to his forum activities if the defendant carries on quan-
titatively extensive activities in the forum state. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) ("continuous and systematic" activities); Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969) ("extensive
or wide-ranging" activities).
93. Secrest Machine Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 664, 669, 660 P.2d 399, 402,
190 Cal. Rptr. 175, 178 (1983).
94. Id. at 672, 660 P.2d at 404, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
95. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 151, 545 P.2d 264, 268, 127 Cal. Rptr.
352, 356 (1976) (factors utilized to determine the reasonableness of exercising juris-
diction).
96. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113, 118 (1969).
97. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. - 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 & n.7 (1985).
98. d. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2179.
99. See id. at - 105 S. Ct. at 2178. The Court in Burger King listed the benefits
received by a franchisee from a franchisor. d.
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tacts requirement of the California test.1'" It is submitted that the
California court should find the exercise of jurisdiction reasona-
ble, in furtherance of its policy of expansive jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants, 0 1 unless it finds a disparity in the bargaining
powers of the parties such as would create inherent unfairness to
the defendant'0 and there is no overriding interest in regulating
franchisors.'"
III. CONCLUSION
The existing case law of New York and California would seem
to support the exercise of jurisdiction under the facts as found by
the district court of Florida and adopted by the Supreme Court in
Burger King. The Supreme Court has effectively dispelled any
doubt on this issue that had existed in these jurisdictions prior to
the Burger King decision, particularly under California's broad
statute. The potential ramification of this decision is not in the
creation of a new basis of personal jurisdiction, but rather, in the
creation of nationwide service of process in favor of franchisors
over their franchisees so long as the agreements are deemed to
give "sufficient notice" to all parties involved. One can only hope
that the Supreme Court will heed its own warning' °4 and avoid an
100. See Secrest Machine Corp. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 664, 669, 660 P.2d 399,
403, 190 Cal. Rptr. 175, 179 (1983). A manufacturer engages in economic activity 'as a
matter of commercial actuality" when it is reasonably foreseeable that he will realize a
gain. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113, 120 (1969).
101. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 151, 545 P.2d 264, 268, 127 Cal. Rptr.
352, 356 (1976).
102. Cf. supra note 38. Should a finding of fact be entered by the court that the fran-
chisees were not sufficiently experienced in business dealings to be charged with construc-
tive knowledge that California was the actual corporate headquarters of the franchisor, it
would be unconscionable to require the franchisees to litigate in California. See Burger
King v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
103. Sic McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (state has interest in
regulating insurance business).
104. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2189 n.28 (1985).
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unfair exercise of personal jurisdiction on the basis of standard-
ized franchise agreement language.'"
Louis M. Lagalante
105. d. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Mhe [Burger King]
Court seems ultimately to rely on nothing more than standard boilerplate language con-
tained in various documents to establish that respondent 'purposefully availed himself of
the benefits and protections of Florida's laws.' "Id. at , 105 S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
